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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
FAIRFIELD IRRIGATION COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. \ 
ERNEST CARSON and MRS. ERNEST )( 
CARSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 7670 
Petition For Rehearing and Brief In 
Support Thereof 
Comes now respondent and respectfully petitions the 
Court for a rehearing herein on the grounds that the court 
erred: 
1. In holding that the statutes in effect prior to 1935 
required anyone to make a statutory filing on the waters in 
question in order to appropriate the same, and 
2. In holding that respondent was not misled by the 
change in concept as to public waters. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. STATUTES PRIOR TO 1935 DID NOT REQUIRE 
A FILING ON UNDERGROUND WATER FROM ANY-
ONE. 
The court has here held that the waters in question had 
been abandoned and had reverted to the public by 1912-
that they were by 1912 public waters subject to appropri-
ation (page 4). The court then held that the statutes in 
effect from 1903 to 1935 required a filing by respondent, 
because respondent did not come within "the exception of 
the Hansen case." 
It is respectfully submitted that the court has over-
looked the fact that the statutes at all times prior to 1935 
did not purport to give the State Engineer jurisdiction over 
underground water. Without a single exception every ap-
plication filed from 1903 until after 1935 on artesian water 
and percolating water has been rejected. It was because 
of the fact that the State Engineer did not have jurisdic-
tion over such waters that Mr. Justice Folland in Wrathall 
v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 40 P. (2d) 755, made his judicial. 
recommendation (page 158 Utah Reports) that the Legis-
lature bring water from artesian basins under the control 
of the State Engineer. As was noted by Mr. Justice Folland 
in the Wra thall case: 
"In no legislative act, from the beginning down to 
the present, are subterranean waters expressly men-
tioned, except in the later enactments wher~ water in 
tmderground streams flowing in known or defined chan-
nels are declared to be the property of the public . . . . 
Whether underground percolating waters be regarded 
as public or not the one thing needed at this time to 
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3 
effect a conservation of this natural resource is legis-
lation extending a more definite control by the state' 
engineer or other public authority .... " 
Following that recommendation the statutes were 
amended in 1935 to extend the State Engineer's jurisdiction 
for the first time to underground water. 
The 1935 statute did not change the waters which were 
publicly owned. It could not have done so. It would have 
violated constitutional due process to proceed by legislative 
fiat to transfer private water to public water. This ·Court 
so stated in the Riordan case. Because of this, the c·ourt 
said in the Riordan case that underground waters had al-
ways been public waters. All the 1935 amendment did was 
to follow the recommendation of Mr. Justice Folland and· 
extend the jurisdiction and control of the State Engineer to 
this class of water. 
To hold that the 1903 statute requiring a filing on 
ground water, as the court has done in the instant case, 
is to ascribe to the Legislature the doing of a useless act in 
1935. If the statutes prior to 1935 already required a fil-
ing on underground water as the cou.rt has here held, there 
was no need for the 1935 amendment. The Hansen case 
would then be simply a judicial exception to the statutory 
requirement, so that a land owner would not be penalized 
by not having filed. We submit that the 1935 amendment 
was not the doing of a useles~ act, that Mr. Justiec Folland 
\Vas correct when he said that no legislative act had applied_ 
to underground water, and that his recommendation that 
the State Engineer be given control of ground water was 
sound. 
In short, all waters have always been publicly owned. 
Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P. 922. But only water in known 
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4 
or defined channels was placed under the jurisdiction of 
the State Engineer in 1903. The balance of these public 
waters (both on public and private lands) could still be ap-
propriated by useage. In 1934 Mr. Justice Folland recom-
mended that the Legislature extend the State Engineer's 
control to this class of water also. This was done by the 
1935 amendment. Until the 1935 amendment no applica-
tion to appropriate artesian waters could have been legally 
filed, because the State Engineer had no jurisdiction over 
that class of water. 
The State E'ngineer is an administrative officer of limi-
ted, as distinguished from general, jurisdiction. He has 
only the powers granted to him by statute. Tanner v Beer, 
49 Utah 536, 165 P. 465. By the statute in 1903 he was 
granted. jurisdiction over streams and other sources of wa"! 
ter ''in known or defined channels.'' He could not extend 
his jurisdiction to any other class of water, even though 
such waters were public waters. 
The court has held against us because we did not make 
a statutory filing prior to 1933. We assert that none could 
have been made. These were wells. Like the waters in the 
cases cited below, these wells were never under the State 
Engineer's jurisdiction until the 1935 .amendment. Like in. 
the cases cited below, a filing, if ·made, would have and 
' -
sh~uld have been rejected. 
The statutes prior to 1935 dealing with this subject 
came into the law in 1903. Se~ Sec. 47, Chap. 100, Laws 
of Utah, 1903. There public water was defined to exclude 
all underground water except that flowing in "known or de-
fined channels.'' Only water in such defined channels was 
under the jurisdiction and control of the State Engineer. 
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Waters not in kno\v nor defined channels were not within 
his jurisdiction. The cases are uniform-no filing on any 
class of water other than· water in known or defined chan-
nels could have been accepted. Section 100-3-1 requiring 
a filing (also in effect in 1903) applied- only to waters which 
had been defined by Section 100-1-1. All other water (wells, 
drains, tunnels, etc.) could not be filed on. 
This very problem was considered ~by the court in 
Wrathall v. Johnson, supra, Mr. Justice Folland at page 157 
explained the concept which we have set forth above in the 
following words: · 
"While the statute (Section 100-1-1, Revised Stat(~ 
utes 1933) is not entirely free from ambiguity, it would 
seem to exclude percolating waters from the waters 
declared to be the property of the public. Section 2780 
of Comp. Laws Utah 1888, which recognizes the right 
to the use of water 'whenever any person or persons 
shall have taken, diverted and used any of the unap-
propriated water of any natural stream, water course, 
lake, or spring, or other natural source of supply,' were 
intended to include percolating waters. These words 
have been construed and have been made applicable to 
percolating waters only when the appropr~ation was 
made while the lands on which or in which such waters 
were found were still part of the public domain, and 
by the cases heretofore referred to restricted to such 
meaning." 
Mr. Justice Folland went on to state that in no legis-
lative act from the beginning down to the present are sub-
terranean waters expressly mentioned, and then went on 
with his recommendation that the Legislature bring under-
ground waters unde~ the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. 
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2. THE CASES PRIO·R TO THE' RIORDAN CASE 
UNIF\ORMLY HELD THAT THIS WATER COULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN FILED OIN BY RE'SPONDENT. 
Until the Riordan case, there is not one case in all of 
the Utah Reports where a filing on developed water had 
been accepted by the State Engineer or upheld by the Court. 
We are therefore at a loss to understand why the court 
would hold that the respondent and its predecessors were 
not misled by a change in ·concept and that they could have 
and should have made a filing in 1912 when these waters 
reverted to the public. We respectfully submit that a fil-
ing made on these waters at that time would have and 
should have been rejected. There are numerous cases from 
this c·ourt involving waters of this class under circumstan-
ces similar to those of the instant case, in which a statu-
tory filing was attempted and in which the State Engineer 
and the court both held that the filing was improper. We 
believe that the cases, insofar as a filing is concerned were 
correct under the statutes as they existed at that time. The 
cases to follow demonstrate forcefully the utter futility of 
making a filing at any time prior to 1935. 
Immediately before 1903, a statute covering appropri-
ation generally and using language equally as broad as that 
. used in 1903 was held to have no application to water having 
its origin in percolationk from private lands. In view of this 
helding in 1900, the Legislature certainly would have been 
more explicit had it intended the 1903 amendment to extend 
to such waters. The case is Willow Creek v. Michaelsen, 
21 Utah 248. The 1903 statute applied to waters in "known 
or defined channels." The statute existing in 1900 provided 
that waters of a ''natural stream, water course, lake, spring 
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or other natural source of supply" were subject to appropri-
ation. Certainly, waters from wells were a natural source 
of supply, as that term is usually used, and so were pe,rco-
lating \Vaters. This Court said, however, that this statute 
did not apply to "springs, or streams or other water arising 
through percolation on private land." In that case a stream 
actually flowed from the lands in question. The stream was 
a natural stream, not developed by the activities of man. 
But it did not appear until after the land had passed to pri-
vate ownership. The Court said that it could not be ap-
propriated and that the statute did not apply. 
Two years earlier in Crescent Mining Company v. Sil-
ver King Mining Co., 17 Utah 444, the Silver King Mine had 
developed a flow of water by digging a mining tunnel. The 
tunnel was dug prior to 1883 and the waters ran from the 
tunnel and commingled with the waters of a natural lake 
or pond as was the case here. The Crescent Mining Co. 
made a diligence appropriation of the water from the lake 
and fully complied with the law regarding appropriation 
as it then existed. The waters flowing from the tunnel were 
thus used by Crescent for more than seven years and Cres-
cent claimed that by complying fully with the laws of 1880 
regarding appropriation it had appropriated the tunnel wa-
ter. The Supreme Court held to the contrary and said that 
water from the tunnel was percolating water and that it 
was owned by Silver King and was not subject to approp-
riation. 
The case of Peterson v. Eureka Hill Mining Company, 
53 Utah 70, 176 P. 729, involved a dispute which arose in 
1912. This 1912 date is important, because it is the date 
that the court in the instant case says the waters here in-
volved had reverted to the public. In the Peterson case, 
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Peterson made an application to appropriate, just as the 
court said we should have done here. The waters there, 
as here, were developed waters-coming from a mining tun-
nel. Prior to the excavation of the tunnel there was a small 
seep which flowed some 150 feet, but it did not leave the 
land. Then a substantial flow was developed hy the tunnel, 
and the tunnel water did flow from the land. In the instant 
case, water was developed by wells which did flow from the 
land. In that case, the Court said that even if it were as-
sumed that the ·digger of the tunnel had not properly ac-
quired the right to use the water in question as an appropri-
ator, still a filing could not prevail, because the water was 
hot open to filing. The Court said at page 76: 
"When his application to appropriate the water 
from lsaid spring was made the land upon which the 
spring is located had ceased to be public domain for a 
period of more than eight years, and the title thereto 
during all of said time was vested in the defendant. 
Under such circumstances the plaintiff could not, over 
the protest of the defendant, acquire any right to the 
water in said spring at the time he made application 
therefor in the State Engineer's office, (citing Kinney 
on Irrigation). It is clear, therefore, that quite apart 
from defendant's claim respecting its appropriation and 
use of the waters from the spring during the many 
years before stated, plaintiff's. claim to said water, ac-
cording· to his own statements, can not prevail, since 
it dates only from September 1912, at which time the 
title to the land on which the spring is located had long 
since passed into private ownership." 
Thus, both immediately before the 1903 statute and 
in 1912 when the waters here involved reverted to the pub-
lic, this Court held that waters developed on private lands 
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were not under the jurisdiction of the State Engineer and 
that a filing thereon by a person in the position of respond-
ent in this case could not prevail. 
Next came Deseret Livestock v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 
25, 239 P. 479. The same distinction was made in that case, 
again demonstrating that even had the respondent made a 
filing ·in this case, the filing would have been rejected both 
by the Court and the State Engineer. In the Deseret Live-
stock case, twelve springs were involved. Several· of the 
springs yielded a sufficient flow to form a defined channel. 
The remainder did not. Deseret made a statutory filing· on 
all of the waters, i. e., those which formed a channel and 
those which did not. Hlooppiania had been using both clas-
ses.of water prior to the filing. As to the water in defined 
channels, the Court held that the filing with the State En-
gineer prevailed and that a filing was indispensable to initi-
ate a right. As to the waters which did not form a channel 
the Court held that the filing was ineffectual. P, other 
words, the State Engineer was compelled to refuse to take 
jurisdiction over percolating waters. 
The same question was pointed up in Holman v. Chris-
tensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 457·. There again a seep had 
been developed into a substantial flow by artificial means. 
The waters were collected in man-made drains and then 
flowed in substantial quantities fro~ the land of the ap-
propriator. In this regard the case is again directly in point 
with the instant case. In both cases man-made develop-
ments were present. In the instant case the evidence clearly 
indicates that without the man-made development the wa-
ter would not have flowed to the surface and into the Fair-
field Springs. In the I-Iolman case, the Court noted that 
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the evidence was not sufficient to deter1nine whether the 
water from the seep would have reached the surface and 
flowed from the land, 'but it expressly said that it did not 
hold taht water which was caused to run from the land by 
ot~r than natural means was subject to appropriation. The 
Court went on to note that the drains had increased the 
flow 100 per cent and that ''in no event is the defendant en-
titled to more than one-half of.the water which flows from 
the plaintiffs' drain." The Court remanded the case for a 
determination of the quantity of the water available prior 
to the digging of the drains, but said that since it appeared 
that the water in controversy arose on the plaintiffs' lands 
and that the plaintiffs had for some years been in control 
of the water, the burden was cast upon the defendant to 
show the nature and extent of his prior use. 
Then came Mr. Justice Folland's discussion in the 
Wrathall case, supra, Beginning at page 149, all of the 
cases which we have cited above are noted .and essentially 
the quotes set forth above were given. After analyzing 
these cases, he stated: 
''The cases thus far discussed establish, I think, 
the rule that the owner of the soil is the owner of wa-
ters '·percolating in or through his lands and that such 
waters are not subject to appropriation by any one 
except the owner, and do not disclose that such owner 
is obliged to comply with the law of the state with re-
spect to ·making his appropriation in the manner by 
law required; that is, he may put his waters to a bene-
ficial use on the lands where found, or elsewhere where 
others' rights are not impaired, not by reason of the 
law of prior appropriation, but because of his owner-
ship of the freehold in which· such waters are perco-
lating." 
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Thus right up until 1934 this Court was announcing to 
the people that statutes governing the law of appropriation 
did not apply at all to underground or developed water, and 
that such water could be put to use without complying with 
the statutory requirements. The statutes as they had exis-
ted from 1903 simply were not construed as applying to this 
class of water. Developed ·waters had been the frequent 
subject of litigation. They were frequently filed up~n, but 
as demonstrated above, every single filing was rejected, and 
they should have been, because the State Engineer did not 
have jurisdiction over such waters. The Court, because of 
an erroneous legal concept, had been treating the waters as 
private waters. But the Court recognized in the Wrathall 
case that it might have been in error in holding these wa-
ters to be private waters. It nevertheless recognized that 
even though the waters were public waters, they had not/ 
theretofore been brought under the requirement of a statu-
tory filing. This led Justice Folland to make his recom-
mendation which resulted in amendments in 1935 to extend 
the control of the State Engineer to this class· of water. 
Then and only then was it necessary to make a statutory 
filing on developed water. Certainly, respondent and its 
' ' -. 
predecessors were as much misled as the· owner of the land 
as to the no\v announced necessity for making a statutory 
filing. 
The Hansen v. Salt Lake City case was, we believe, 
correctly decided, but we submit that it did not make a ju-
dicial exception from the statute. It merely correctly noted 
that the statutes prior to 1935 did not apply to undergroun9 
water. 
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SUMMARY 
This holding does not involve merely the narrow fact 
situation presented here. There are many cases in the state 
where appropriations have been made by diligence from 
lands not owned by the appropriator. If this holding pre-
vails, no individual who is using water from underground 
sources has a good water right if he initiated his use after 
1903 on land not owned· by him. He is subject to having 
the water taken from him at any time by a filing. The de-
cision will place in the law of appropriation of underground 
water a hopeless confusion. Appropriation of underground 
water from the public domain by useage was so well known 
and so common a practice that there are numerous rights 
which had such an origin after 1903. Such waters were 
subject to appropriation even prior to 1903. Sullivan v. 
Northern Spy, 11 Utah 48. But a filing was never permit-
ted until 1935. The uniform administrative practice of the 
State Engineer prior to 1935 was to reject a filing from any-
one (the land owner or the stranger) on developed water. 
The State Engineer correctly held that he had no jurisdic-
tion over such waters. To now leave the question of ap-
propriation of underground water under the nebulous con-
cept that the land owner was misled so that he did not need 
to file, but that other persons were not misled so that they 
must have. filed, finds no basis in the statutes and destroys 
the solid work done by this Court in the Riordan and Han-
sen cases. Those cases had squarely developed the prin-
ciple that underground water always was public water, and 
that the law must now be applied as though that concept 
had always been recognized. They also established that 
after 1935 a filing on ground water was necessary, put that 
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prior to 1935 a filing \vas not necessary. They had thus 
given to the appropriator of developed water a definite date 
as to when filings became necessary. It took the ·Court 
nearly 20 years to develop the same principle for surface 
water. Beginning with the Deseret Livestock case, the hold-
ing was that filings were indispensable to a surface approp-
riation after 1903, but not before. The doctrine was chal-
lenged in the Wmthall case, but was definitely laid at rest 
in the Wellsville ·case, (104 Utah 448). Thus the law had 
followed the statutes and become definite and easy of ad-
ministration. On surface water, useage alone was all right 
until1903, but after 1903 the statute required a filing. On 
ground water useage alone was all right until1935, but after 
1935 a filing was necessary, because the statute was amen-
ded pursuant to a judicial recommendation to place that 
water under the control of the State Engineer. 
The court now says that we must lose this water which 
we used ~ontinuously for 29 years after 1905, because we 
did not file. The prior cases make it unmistakably clear 
that had we filed, it would have been rejected. Such a hold-
ing would have been correct, because the State Engineer 
did not until 1935 have jurisdiction over such waters. The 
court now says that because we wer_e not misled into not 
filing, we cannot take the advantage of the holding in the 
ffansen case, thus in effect stating that the statutes required 
us to file, but that the Hansen case made an exception for 
the land owner. This denies us the equal protection of the 
law. Our rehearing is predicated upon our assertion that 
no statute required a filing on developed water prior to 1935 
and that had we filed it would properly have been rejected. 
It is predicated also on the assertion that if the Hansen case 
did make an exception, it should be extended to us, because 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
of the fact every person who n1ade a filing on developed wa-
ter prior to 1935 had his filing rejected by the Court. 
We, therefore, earnestly request the Court to grant a 
rehearing on this matter, and request it to re-examine the 
. statutes and the cases. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
GEORGE S. BALLIF 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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